

Philosophy of Logic and Language
Names

Primary Readings

- (!) **Frege, G.** ‘**On Sense and Reference**’ in Frege G., *Translations from Philosophical Writings*, tr. by Black, M. & Geach, P. (Blackwell, 1952) (Reprinted in Moore, A., (ed.), *Meaning and Reference* and various other collections).
- (!) **Kripke, S.**, *Naming and Necessity*, (Blackwell, 1980), especially: **lecture I, pp.22-34, and Lecture II**. (These are also reprinted in Martinich, A., (ed.), *The philosophy of language*).
- (!) **Evans, G.**, ‘**The casual theory of reference**’, *Proceeding of the Aristotelian society*, supplementary volume (1973). (Reprinted in both Martinich and Moore)
- **Stanley, J.**, ‘**Names and Rigid Designation**’, in Hale, B. and Wright, C. (eds.), *A Companion to the Philosophy of Language*, Blackwell (1997), pp. 555-585.
- **McDowell, J.**, ‘**On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name**’, *Mind* 86 (1977), pp. 159-185; (reprinted in Moore).
- **Searle, J.**, ‘**Proper names**’, *Mind* 1958 (also reprinted in Martinich).

Background Readings:

- Lycan, W., *The philosophy of language*, chapter 3-4.
- Reimer, M., ‘Reference’, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/reference/>)

Questions:

- (1) Do proper names have a sense? If so, is this consistent with the claim that they are rigid designators?
- (2) Can a name have a meaning even if it does not refer?
- (3) Can proper names be analyzed as definite descriptions?
- (4) How can we explain the fact that identity statements can be informative? Can we give such an explanation which is consistent with the claim that names are rigid designators?